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Abstract 
 
 
A new chapter in the history of technology seems to be unleashed. Until recently, man-made 
technologies basically functioned as prostheses, as external prosthetic extensions of human bodies, 
directed towards the outside world, allowing us to interact with and manipulate objects more 
effectively, eventually transforming humans into ‘prosthesis-gods’ (Freud 1930). Currently, 
technological devices have begun to move inwards: entering our bodies and brains, functioning as 
implants rather than as extensions. Self-monitoring is an important objective of this trend. Due to 
recent developments in technosciences, such as synthetic biology, tissue engineering and 
nanomedicine, our sway over the human ‘condition’ (in its literal, biomedical sense) is increasing, 
down to the molecular level, and up to the point of becoming uncanny. New options for drug delivery 
and bio-implants are entering (pervading) human bodies and brains. On the one hand, this may be 
seen as strengthening human autonomy and agency. On the other hand, we must consider the 
possibility that we are the targets rather than the agents of this process. Rather than being in control, 
we may become increasingly dependent on these new technologies, emerging in the boundary zone 
between therapy and enhancement. On the one hand, intimate technologies allegedly open up new 
practices of the Self, enabling individuals to become the ‘managers’ of their own life and health. On 
the other hand, human beings are controlled by the gaze of the Other, which invokes a sense of 
unease. An exemplification is the Snyderome project. A prominent geneticist was closely monitored 
over the course of 14 months, measuring everything, resulting in the integrative Personal Omics 
Profile, a comprehensive omics portrait (“extremely high coverage”), combining “deep sequencing” 
with more than 3 billion measurements of molecules. This portrait is highly personal, but at the same 
time highly impersonal: opening up individuals to a digital panopticon: a molecularised version of the 
‘voice of conscience’ in the form of a computer monitor, informing us that we must change their life on 
a daily basis: the superego of intimate technologies in the terabyte age. What is the fate of the human 
subject in the era of Big Data and intimate technologies? 
 
_______________ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
‘Extimate’ Technologies: Empowerment, Intrusiveness, Surveillance 
 
Introduction 
 
In the opening scene of the futuristic cult novel Accelerando by Charles Stross (2005), ICT wizard 
Manfred (the novel’s key protagonist) arrives in the plaza in front of Amsterdam Central Station with 
eyeballs “powered up” (p. 3) and equipped with special high-tech glasses which keep him acutely up-
to-date, so that he lives minutes (or even days and weeks) into other people’s future, assimilating 
gigabytes of content every day, just to stay current (p. 5). Soon, he encounters some other early 
adopters of smart technologies, like-minded youngsters, spreading “clouds of electronic emissions” as 
they move about.  Accelerando reads like a literary laboratory, inviting us to explore the emerging 
future, with Manfred as our guide, or research subject. How will human existence and the human life-
world be affected (perhaps we should say: infected) by this upcoming avalanche of high-tech and 
miniature devices, also known as intimate technologies?  
 
The book Radical Evolution: the Promise and Peril of Enhancing our Minds, our Bodies – and what it 
means to be Human by science author Joel Garreau (2005) has a similar objective: exploring the 
emerging future, albeit this time by visiting and interviewing pioneer researchers in their laboratories. 
The general message is that we are reshaping ourselves, equipping ourselves with embedded 
devices, for x-ray vision of infrared vision (via retinal implants) for instance, or with exoskeletons. We 
are approaching an inflection point in history, Garreau argues. For millennia, technologies tended to 
be aimed outward, allowing us to control and reshape our environment: the objects we encountered. 
Now, however, the direction seems to be suddenly reversed, as technologies are taking an inward 
turn. We ourselves (our human bodies and brains) are now increasingly becoming the target of choice. 
New technologies have begun to merge with our minds, our memories, our metabolisms, our moods, 
our personalities even: we are really entering the era of “engineered evolution” (Garreau 2005, p. 6). A 
plethora of (more or less plausible, more or less futuristic) examples is exhibited and assessed in 
Garreau’s fascinating panorama. Besides inserting various kinds of retinal and cochlear implants, or 
bioinspired materials and tissues produced from stem cells into our bodies we could, for example, add 
a new artificial chromosome to the nucleus of our cells, thereby providing additional plug-in-points as it 
were, where genetic modules could be implanted with additional features. This auxiliary chromosome 
would be a universal delivery vehicle for bio-molecular implants, including an on-off switch activated by 
injections (p. 117). 
 
Similar prospects are invoked by the recent report published by the Dutch Rathenau Institute entitled 
Intimate Technologies (van Est et al, 2014). Electronic gadgets are shrinking in size, coming closer, 
becoming wearable, the authors argue, they are now just on the outside, on our skin, while cochlear 
implants, deep brain stimulation electrodes etc. have already entered our bodies. And indeed, the 
advent of intimate technologies is being heralded by a chorus of authors. The relations between 
technologies and human bodies are becoming increasingly intimate, Lucie Dalibert (2014) claims.  
Contemporary objects such as wearable computers are presented as intimate machines; we become 
increasingly dependent on them and they demand that we focus daily attention on our increasingly 
intimate relationships with them (Turkle 2004). New technologies are pervading our lifeworld, they are 
becoming us. Micro-implants, health monitoring technologies and Google Glass exemplify new types 
of gadgets that are increasingly getting closer to, or even penetrating under our skin, giving rise to an 
intimate interplay between bodies and technologies (Lettow 2011). 
 
In Polar Inertia, Paul Virilio (2000) has argued that three technological revolutions can be 
distinguished. The first revolution began in the 19
th
 century and notably involved transport (trains, cars, 
airplanes, etc.). The second revolution emerged in the 20
th
 century and focussed on technologies of 
 
 
 
 
transmission (radio, TV, etc. up to the computer and the Internet). The third (currently ongoing) 
revolution entails processes of ‘miniaturization’ and is about to culminate in the colonisation of the 
intimacy of the human body with the help of nanotech implants. This is the challenge currently facing 
us, as Virilio sees it: how to cope with technologies that are actually inhabiting us? 
 
Ernst Kapp (1877), founding father of philosophy of technology as a research field, argued that 
traditional instruments were actually projections or exteriorisations of bodily organs, allowing us to 
control and manipulate objects in the outside world (Lemmens 2008). A hammer, for instance, can 
basically be regarded as an extension of (and as a robust version of) a human fist. The direction of 
movement was from the inside (the sphere of desire) towards the outside (the recalcitrant 
environment). Technology is basically the mechanisation of the organic, eventually transforming 
human beings into “prosthesis-gods” (Freud 1930/1948). But we are currently experiencing a dramatic 
reversal. As indicated, miniature gadgets are now moving from the outside towards the inside, they are 
now turned towards ourselves and entering our bodies and brains. The micro-mechanic is implanted in 
the organic and may gradually come to replace our most intimate organs and tissues. We ourselves 
have now become the target of change, allegedly resulting in an increased modifiability (and reduced 
recalcitrance) of the human body. In the next session, I will assess these claims, concerns and 
developments from a (psychoanalytically inspired) philosophical perspective.   
Extimate technologies: a psychoanalytic assessment 
 
As indicated, I will use a psychoanalytic framework of interpretation to assess the emerging 
technologies of today, as part of a diagnostics of the present. What is it that makes these smart, 
embedded gadgets so alluring and disconcerting? What is at stake? To articulate the ambivalence 
these technologies evoke, a concept coined by Sigmund Freud (1919/1947) may be helpful, namely 
the concept of the “uncanny”, referring to that which is both familiar and unfamiliar, that which 
positions itself in the boundary zone between natural and artificial, the living and non-living. But the 
uncanny also refers to that which should have remained hidden, but is now being opened-up and 
exposed. The uncanny positions itself in the intermediate spaces between bodies, automatons and 
corpses and seems especially apt to capture anxieties raised by biotechnical artefacts (Assoun 1997). 
The optimal exemplification of the uncanny is a body part, a ‘partial object’, an organic component 
which has become detached from the body as a whole: a hand, an eye, a breast or a foot, something 
that has become disconnected, or has been replaced.  
 
Uncanny entities such as glass eyes and plastic hands have been around for while however, so the 
question is: what is so new about intimate technologies: where can the discontinuity be located? The 
most pertinent difference between traditional prostheses and intimate gadgets seems to reside in the 
size of the latter, in combination with their embeddedness. They really seem to become part of the 
daily life of the body as a whole. They fil up invisible gaps, but instead of really solving our 
deficiencies, they may easily become objects of daily concern in their own right. Indeed, they are likely 
to become quite demanding. They monitor us and continuously look at us. 
 
Building on Freud, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has coined a term that seems to capture 
the newness of these new technologies quite convincingly, namely the concept of the extimate: that 
which is both intimate and external (Lacan 2006; Zwart 2014). Instead of ‘intimate technologies’, 
therefore, I would rather speak of ‘extimate technologies’ because, on closer inspection, these 
gadgets are not really intimate at all, and their status is much more ambiguous. Lacan’s concept of the 
extimate refers to that which is both intimate and foreign, both embedded and intrusive, both alien and 
familiar, both life-saving and disrupting. The extimate is that which offers us a life-line, while at the 
same time opening up daily existence to the gaze of the Big Other, the electronic super-ego, 
 
 
 
 
persistently trailing us and spurring us to change our lifestyle, our way of living, giving rise to 
permanent (self)-monitoring and intense surveillance. Let me elucidate this concept with the help of an 
example. 
The Snyderome case 
 
In 2012, Michael Snyder and his research team (at the Department of Genetics, Stanford University) 
published the ‘integrative Personal Omics Profile’ (iPOP) of a single individual, a 54-year old male 
volunteer, whom they had closely monitored over the course of 14 months (Chen et al 2014).
1
 This 
longitudinal case study resulted in a comprehensive ‘omics’ portrait (“extremely high coverage”), 
combining “deep sequencing” (of the genotype) with more than 3 billion measurements of molecules 
(i.e. the person’s phenotype). Although the research subject was a “healthy individual”, the project at 
the same time amounted to a case study in the sense of a Krankengeschichte as two minor viral 
infections, together with (unexpected) evidence of the subject’s propensity for diabetes, constituted the 
dramatic highlights of the story. 
 
Soon, it turned out that the “male volunteer” of this N=1 experiment (surrounded by qualified personnel 
and costly equipment) was none other than Michael Snyder himself, the department chair now acting 
as his own research subject of choice, turning his body into an omics laboratory. The experiment 
resulted in what has been referred to as the Snyderome
2
 or even the Narciss-ome.
3
 Snyder himself 
made it known that he plans to remain a study subject for life,
4
 adding new sources of information as 
the process unfolds, including data procured from body samples such as breath, urine, faeces (‘stool 
microbiome’), saliva, etc., in other words bodily materials released via various bodily apertures that are 
usually referred to in psychoanalysis as ‘erogenous zones’. 
 
Snyder’s idea is that, via high resolution self-monitoring, human individuals will become the proactive 
managers of their own health. It will allow ‘us’ to take medicine into our own hands, with doctors 
merely acting as advisors. Individuals are expected to heavily wire themselves, so as to register pulse, 
heartbeat, stress (transpiration) and numerous other indicators continuously. The idea is that 
measurements of thousands of factors can be integrated through devices such as iPhones and 
compared with big data references, available 24/7 at open-source repositories (vast science clouds), 
after which the outcomes can be translated into every-day options (diet, exercise, etc.). It is expected 
that especially the aetiology of mystery symptoms (such as unexplained fatigue or depression) can 
thus be elucidated. 
 
But rather than putting individuals in charge of their own health, the repositories which are set up to 
provide reference data (i.e. standards for normality) can easily become an electronic, molecularised 
version of the super-ego, the ‘voice of conscience’ of the terabyte age, the Big (digital) (Br)Other. On a 
daily basis, computer ‘monitors’ will be telling future individuals that they must change their lives in 
order to optimise somatic functioning, so that they can live up to normalcy standards, and postpone / 
mitigate the impacts of unhealthy life-styles and ageing. In other words, it would be a simplification to 
interpret the advent of extimate self-monitoring technologies merely in terms of ‘empowerment’. I will 
conclude my analysis with a second case study, an anecdote taken from everyday experience. 
 
Extimate technologies: a case study 
 
                                               
1
 The article listed forty-one authors with Michael Snyder acting as final and corresponding author.  
2
 http://snyderome.stanford.edu/ 
3
 http://www.nature.com/news/the-rise-of-the-narciss-ome-1.10240 
4
 https://www.genomeweb.com/sequencing/snyderome-study-suggests-much-gain-individuals-genome-molecular-profiles 
 
 
 
 
Some weeks after attending the Strasbourg conference, I joined the daily cue on Saint Peter’s square 
in Rome (where I participated in another scholarly conference, this time on neuro-enhancement) to 
visit the imposing Basilica. Many languages are spoken by visitors in this cue, coming from around the 
globe, while emails are checked and calls are made: a multilingual crowd. Finally, after half an hour of 
patience, it was my turn to pass the electronic surveillance gate: 21
st
 century technology, positioned 
between two imposing marble pillars. I deposited all the electronic gadgets I was carrying with me 
(memory stick, iPhone, credit cards) on a small table before sliding through the clearance gate. 
Nothing happened, and a Swiss guard kindly waved, inviting me to enter. Right behind me, however, 
the electronic alarm system suddenly sounded, as an elderly Flemish couple wanted to pass the gate 
as well, but the woman quickly explained the situation by saying, in English, “My husband has two 
hips”. 
 
I was struck by her impromptu remark. It caught my ear for various reasons. First of all, it is an 
example of what Freud would call ‘condensation’. Something is bypassed, replaced, concealed or 
camouflaged. What the woman actually intended to say was something like “my husband has two 
artificial metallic hip implants, and this is what the surveillance system is detecting”, but uttering such a 
long and complicated sentence would have focussed attention on her husband’s condition (already 
emphasised by the sounding system, so that he already had become the focus of attention of various 
impatient bystanders) even more. Something intimate, something which should have remained hidden, 
was unwittingly brought to the surface, accentuated even. As if the surveillance system was shouting 
into our ears: “Look people, this person has both his hips replaced!” Electronic surveillance gates are 
multiplying. We find them at the entrances, not only of museums and cathedrals, but also of airport 
gates, shopping malls, governmental buildings and in countless other places. Perhaps the woman and 
her ageing husband were tired of being reminded all the time of the presence of the latter’s implants 
by electronic detectors. Perhaps it was a painful reminder of physical deficits which (Freudians would 
no doubt add) can easily be associated, consciously or unconsciously, with other physical problems 
centring on the pelvic zone, related to ageing. 
 
Be this as it may, it must be an uncomfortable experience indeed to become the target of high-tech 
surveillance on a daily basis, as a side-effect of a medical treatment: i.e. the replacement of damaged 
bone tissue and cartilage by embedded prostheses. Therefore, the woman used a diplomatic, 
euphemistic term, in the hope that the surveillance officers would immediately understand what was 
meant, because artificial hips, once highly exceptional, have become quite common, although strictly 
speaking the sentence is a funny one, given the fact that everybody ‘has two hips’, - it is a basic 
ingredient of human anatomy. For Freud, condensation is a mechanism of defence, employed to 
conceal something that is considered embarrassing, threatening, painful or uncanny. Indeed, 
something which should have remained hidden is suddenly detected, emphasised even, namely the 
presence of an artificial and metallic ‘something’ hidden in what seems to be (based on outward 
appearance) a normal organic living body. These intimate, or rather ‘extimate’, metallic items, 
moreover, are detected and highlighted with the help of another instance of extimate technology: an 
electronic surveillance system which is able to screen us, to search and examine us, and which even 
seems able to enter our bodies, with the help of hyper-tech sense organs. 
 
According to Jacques Lacan (1966), condensation basically works as a metaphor: a particular term is 
replaced by another, for instance when someone says “I see three sails on the ocean”, where the word 
“sails” is actually used as a stand-in for “boats”. Something similar occurs in the example given above, 
where the word “hips” is used as a stand-in for “metallic implants”. A problematic signifier (“implants”) 
is substituted by a less distressing, funny term (“hips”), poetic even, in an every-day sense, meant to 
take away the tension, because it would be uncomfortable, or even rude, to draw too much attention to 
the fact that this elderly person, surrounded by an impatient, cuing crowd, is actually a kind of cyborg. 
 
 
 
 
But the surveillance system is inexorable and automatically reveals what surgery, clothing and 
physiotherapy, in combination with the woman’s condensed and jocular sentence, tried to cover up, 
namely the uncanny idea that this person has entered the world of cyborg-embodiment, via the 
presence of two implants in his pelvis. 
 
The anecdote highlights the ambiguous, ubiquitous presence and function of extimate technologies in 
the human life-world in various ways. On the one hand, we could focus on the metallic hip implants 
themselves: embedded and hidden, as a piece of technology that has really entered the body. They 
have improved the husband’s quality of life no doubt, but are bound to remain items of concern 
nonetheless. Will they continue to function properly, will they be electronically detected? On the other 
hand, we could focus on the electronic surveillance device as such, as a piece of technology that has 
entered the everyday world and is becoming ubiquitous, notably in public spaces. Indeed, these 
devices are multiplying, their presence is becoming pervasive. The implants will continue to evolve no 
doubt, so that one day, metallic versions will be replaced by biocompatible, quasi-organic biomaterials, 
intimately embedded within the body, but electronic surveillance devices will evolve as well, their 
precision and resolution will increase as well, so that the interaction between these two types of 
devices (electronic surveillance versus implants) will intensify. These electronic devices increasingly 
function as a kind of super-ego, reminding us of our deficiencies (and their built-in technological 
compensations), notably those we perhaps would like to forget or conceal (Zwart 2015; Hilvoorde & 
Landeweerd 2010). 
 
Something similar would have happened if I would have forgotten to take out my iPhone, for instance, 
having grown so accustomed to its presence that I sometimes am no longer aware of its being-there, 
until the electronic beep of the surveillance system reminds me of the fact that I am becoming 
increasingly dependent upon this gadget, from which I am only temporarily disconnected, for a few 
seconds only. It is an enabling device, providing me with maps and apps and e-mails, but at the same 
time it is an intrusive gadget, allow the electronic panoptic Big Brother (or ‘Big Other’, as Lacan would 
phrase it) to trace me, to keep track of my whereabouts and doings, with the help of the “clouds of 
electronic emissions” produced by such an innocent-looking, extimate device. In other words, extimate 
devices enable various practices of the Self, no doubt, but compensation is due: I must allow the 
electronic Big Other to enter my private sphere and I must feed this Other continuously with 
personalised data in return. 
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